Brazil's presidential election

Sweating into a second round

Oct 10th 2002 | SAO PAULO
From The Economist print edition

The voters require the presidential front-runner to spell out his policies

FOR once, to call an election a celebration of democracy would not be an overstatement. From remote Amazonian forest settlements, where tribesmen in elaborate head-dresses queued patiently to vote, to the grim favelas of Sao Paulo's urban jungle, to the millionaire condos along Rio's Barra da Tijuca beach, on October 6th a hugely diverse, continent-sized country of 115m voters came together in the world's biggest all-electronic election.

Despite technical hitches that delayed the close of polling by several hours in places, and despite isolated reports of political violence and vote-buying, it was a great success. No endless recounts and rows over “pregnant chads” here. Within a few hours, the diskettes from almost all electronic booths had been scanned and the results were out. Belying fears that weak economic growth and continuing social problems are undermining Latin America's faith in democracy, in this the region's largest country only 18% of voters stayed at home, down from 21% in the 1998 presidential election. Blank and spoiled votes totalled just 10%, down from 19% in the last (only partly-electronic) vote.

The voters stopped just short of electing as president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the veteran leader of the left-wing Workers' Party. In this campaign, Lula has donned a business suit, formed an electoral pact with a small conservative party and swapped the fiery radicalism that lost him the past three Brazilian elections for moderation and an image of “love and peace”. Final polls had put him close to outright victory. But at the last moment (perhaps due to his stumbling performance in a televised debate), some voters apparently had second thoughts. Having won 46.4% of the valid votes, Lula must now sweat his way through a run-off ballot on October 27th against Jose Serra, the candidate of the centre-right coalition of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the outgoing president (who cannot stand again).

Though Mr da Silva won almost exactly twice as many votes as Mr Serra, the run-off is not quite a foregone conclusion. That is no bad thing. Mr Serra would perform a useful service if he used television debates over the next fortnight to force Mr da Silva to spell out his economic policies more clearly—especially since Lula and his party opposed many of the economic reforms that they now promise to uphold. Using such televised debates to expose Mr da Silva's weak grasp of policy details is probably Mr Serra's best hope.

Both must scrap for the votes of two slippery populist candidates, Anthony Garotinho, until recently the governor of Rio de Janeiro, who got 18%, and Ciro Gomes, a former governor of the north-eastern state of Ceara, who got 12%. Mr da Silva has invited their small, soft-left parties to join him in government. Mr Gomes quickly pledged “unlimited” backing for Mr da Silva; Mr Garotinho too was reported to be about to endorse Lula.

Since both Mr Gomes and Mr Garotinho stood as opposition candidates, Mr da Silva argues that he will win the backing of all the “76% of Brazilians who voted against the current economic model”. But many of Mr Garotinho's and Mr Gomes's voters are quite conservative—especially the evangelical Christians who are Mr Garotinho's main support base. They might be more attracted to Mr Serra.

As if to underline that a new election is starting, Mr Serra sacked his campaign manager. To stand a chance of overturning Mr da Silva's huge lead, he must do two things, according to Gaudencio Torquato, a political scientist at Sao Paulo University. First, soften his abrasive image by getting out on the streets and mingling with the people, as Mr da Silva has done to great effect. Second, identify himself more closely with Mr Cardoso. Despite Brazilians' desire for change, the president remains personally quite popular. Mr Cardoso's enthusiastic backing at the hustings would help Mr Serra. But the president seems reluctant to sour his relations with Mr da Silva, his more probable successor.

The mood for change also showed in state and congressional elections. Several conservative local political bosses were dumped. They included Fernando Collor, a former president forced out in 1992 over corruption allegations, who failed to make a comeback as governor of his home state of Alagoas. Paulo Maluf, a former governor of Sao Paulo state, failed to make a run-off for his old job.

Leftish candidates gained ground: the Workers' Party beat its most optimistic forecasts. Although it won only two of 27 state governorships outright, it made it into a run-off in eight more. In Congress, it should be the largest party in the lower house (despite the electronic vote, the Electoral Tribunal takes several days to confirm the allocation of seats under Brazil's complicated proportional representation system). But while fortified, Lula's party will still be outnumbered in Congress and in the governorships by the combined strength of Mr Cardoso's coalition parties.

So if he wins, Mr da Silva would be wise to seek a broad alliance including all or part of Mr Cardoso's coalition. David Fleischer, a political scientist at Brasilia University, reckons that a President Lula could win over 309 deputies in the 513-seat lower house and 48 of 81 senators. That would provide a comfortable majority, though short, in the Senate, of the three-fifths required for constitutional changes.

Achieving such a coalition, appointing a credible finance minister and Central Bank president, and pledging to press on with some long-delayed economic reforms might persuade nervous investors that a President Lula could handle Brazil's huge public debts. That would be helpful: Lula's big lead prompted further falls in Brazil's financial markets this week. But investors might note that the next government will be constrained by a centrist Congress. And two hard-left presidential candidates, preaching a rupture with the IMF and financial orthodoxy, scraped barely 0.5% of votes between them. Brazilians voted for change, but não muito.